In broad strokes, here is my view of Microsoft’s
history.
In the beginning, Bill Gates stated the company’s
goal: “A computer on every desk and in every home.”
That was crazy. The PC revolution was well
underway, but the grand total of PCs sold when
Gates stated that mantra was, by today’s standards,
effectively zero. PCs were for hobbyists. Everyone
involved knew they were on to something, but Gates
realized, at the outset, that they were on to
something huge. The industry was measuring sales in
the thousands, but Gates was already thinking about
billions. Here’s Gates, in an interview from 2010:
Paul Allen and I had used that phrase even
before we wrote the BASIC for Microsoft.We
actually talked about it in an article in — I
think 1977 was the first time it appears in print
— where we say, “a computer on every desk and in
every home…” and actually we said, “…running
Microsoft software.” If we were just talking
about the vision, we’d leave those last three
words out. If we were talking an internal company
discussion, we’d put those words in. It’s very
hard to recall how crazy and wild that was, you
know, “on every desk and in every home.” At the
time, you have people who are very smart saying,
“Why would somebody need a computer?” Even Ken
Olsen, who had run this company Digital
Equipment, who made the computer I grew up with,
and that we admired both him and his company
immensely, was saying that this seemed kind of a
silly idea that people would want to have a
computer.
He was right. And not only did the first part of
the phrase come true, the last three words — “…
running Microsoft software” — did too. From the
mid-’90s and for the next decade, there was,
effectively, a computer on every desk and in every
home running Microsoft software. At least 95
percent of them were running the Windows operating
system, and among the rest, most were Macs running
Internet Explorer and probably Microsoft Office
too.
Windows was almost everywhere, and Microsoft was
everywhere.
Peak Microsoft was unfathomably pervasive. They won
so thoroughly that Steve Jobs conceded that they’d
won, telling Wired in February 1996:
The desktop computer industry is dead.
Innovation has virtually ceased. Microsoft
dominates with very little innovation. That’s
over. Apple lost. The desktop market has entered
the dark ages, and it’s going to be in the dark
ages for the next 10 years, or certainly for the
rest of this decade.”
Steve Fucking Jobs said that. He was exactly right.
And who knows where we’d be today if Jobs and NeXT
had not been reunified with Apple the next year.
“A computer on every desk and in every home” was
incredible foresight for 1977. It carried Microsoft
for 25 years of growth. But once that goal was
achieved, I don’t think they knew where to go. They
were like the dog that caught the car. They spent a
lot of time and energy on TV. Not just with Xbox,
which is alive and well today (albeit not a
significant source of income), but with other ideas
that did not pan out, like “media center PCs” and
the joint ownership of “MSNBC”, which was
originally imagined as a sort of cable news
network, website, dessert topping, and floor wax
rolled into one.
What they missed was the next step from every desk
and home: a computer in every pocket. It’s worse
than that, though. They saw it coming, and they
tried. Pocket PC, Windows CE, Windows Mobile —
swings and misses at the next big thing. They
weren’t even close, and damningly, Steve Ballmer
didn’t even seem to realize it. That’s what’s so
damning about that video of him laughing at the
original iPhone. Whenever I dredge up that video, a
handful of defenders will write and tell me it’s
unfair to mock him for his reaction, that he was
actually right — that the original iPhone was too
expensive. But what should have scared Microsoft
wasn’t what the iPhone was in 2007, it was what the
iPhone clearly was going to be in 2008, 2009, 2010.
Prices come down, chips get faster. Software
evolves. Apple had unveiled to the world a personal
computer that fit in your pocket. That was amazing.
That the original iPhone left much room for
improvement is simply the way revolutionary
products always get their start.
Microsoft’s institutional lack of taste had finally
come to bite them in their ass. While Ballmer
laughed at the iPhone and presumably walked around
with a Windows Mobile piece of junk in his pocket,
Larry Page and Sergei Brin carried iPhones. Google
never laughed at the iPhone; it made money from it
by providing web search and maps. Google quickly
became, and remains to this day, a leading
developer of iOS apps. And it was Google that was
fast to follow the iPhone with Android, slurping up
the commodity-market crumbs that Apple, focused as
ever on the quality-minded high end of the market,
eschewed. I don’t think it was ever within
Microsoft’s DNA to produce the iPhone, but what
Android became — the successful fast follower —
could have been theirs if they’d recognized the
opportunity faster. The Microsoft of 1984, a decade
away from industry dominance, wrote software for
the original Mac, and learned from it. When Bill
Gates first saw a Mac, he didn’t laugh — he wanted
to know how it worked, right down to specific
details, like the smooth animation of its mouse
cursor.
No company today has reach or influence anything
like what Microsoft had during the golden era of
the PC. Not Apple, not Google, and not Microsoft
itself. I don’t think Ballmer ever came to grips
with that. Ballmer’s view of the company solidified
when it dominated the entire industry, and he never
adjusted.
Hence Windows 8. One OS for all PCs, traditional
and tablet alike, because that’s the only way for
Windows to run almost all of them, and Windows
running almost all PCs is the way things ought to
be. Rather than accept a world where Windows
persisted as merely one of several massively
popular personal computing platforms, and focus on
making Windows as it was better for people who want
to use desktop and notebook PCs, Microsoft forged
ahead with a design that displeased traditional PC
users and did little to gain itself a foothold in
the burgeoning tablet market. It was easy to see.
Windows 8’s design wasn’t what was best for any
particular device, but instead what seemed best for
Ballmer’s “Windows everywhere” vision of the
industry and Microsoft’s rightful place atop it.
Horace Dediu captures the change in the industry
wrought by iOS and Android in this succinct (and,
as usual, well-illustrated) piece from a few months
ago, writing:
If we include all iOS and Android devices the
“computing” market in Q3 2008 was 92 million
units of which Windows was 90%, whereas in Q3
2013 it was 269 million units of which Windows
was 32%.
That’s a startling change, and Ballmer never seemed
to accept it. Windows 8 wasn’t designed to adjust
to the new world; it was designed to turn back the
clock to the old one.
I think it’s a very good sign that Satya Nadella
comes from Microsoft’s server group. As my
colleague Brent Simmons wrote today:
Creating services for iOS apps doesn’t sound
at all like the Microsoft I used to know. Using
Node.js and JavaScript doesn’t sound like that
Microsoft. The old Microsoft would create
services for their OSes only and you’d have to
use Visual Studio.There’s still a lot of the old
Microsoft there, the Windows, Office, Exchange,
and Sharepoint (WOES) company. It’s most of the
company by far, surely. (I just made up the
acronym WOES. It fits.)But in the Azure group, at
least, there’s recognition that Microsoft can’t
survive on lock-in, that those days are in the
past.Even if you don’t choose to use Microsoft’s
cloud services, I hope you can agree on two
things: that competition is good, and that
Azure’s support-everything policy is the best
direction for the future of the company.
In short, Nadella’s Server division is the one part
of Microsoft that seems designed for, and part of,
the post-iOS, post-Android state of the industry. A
division pushing toward the future, not the past.
Successful companies tend to be true to themselves.
The old Microsoft’s Windows and Office everywhere,
on every device strategy was insanely ambitious,
but also true to their culture. Apple has grown to
eclipse Microsoft in financial size, but never set
its sights on Microsoft-ian market share. Google is
unfocused at the edges, but it’s never tried to act
like any company other than Google. Google makes
operating systems and office applications, but in a
decidedly Google-y way. The last thing Microsoft
should do is attempt to be like Apple or Google.
Cloud computing is one potential path forward. The
cloud is nascent, like the PC industry of 1980. In
30 years we’ll look back at our networked
infrastructure of today and laugh, wondering how we
got a damn thing done. The world is in need of
high-quality, reliable, developer-friendly,
trustworthy, privacy-guarding cloud computing
platforms. Apple and Google each have glaring (and
glaringly different) holes among that list of
adjectives.
Satya Nadella needs to find Microsoft’s new “a
computer on every desk and in every home running
Microsoft software”. Here’s my stab at it:
Microsoft services, sending data to and from every
networked device in the world. The next ubiquity
isn’t running on every device, it’s talking to
every device.
ΠΗΓΗ:
http://daringfireball.net/2014/02/microsoft_past_and_future